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SLAPPing Back in Federal Court:
Florida’s anti-SLAPP Statute
HARRIS BLUM *
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or
“SLAPPs,” are frivolous lawsuits used to silence and harass
critics by forcing them to spend money on legal fees. An
overwhelming majority of states have enacted anti-SLAPP
statutes to shield against these lawsuits, recognizing their
potential to chill free speech and healthy debate. Though
anti-SLAPP statutes come in different shapes and sizes, they
commonly employ procedural mechanisms such as expedited dismissal procedures, heightened standards at the
pleading and summary judgment stages, and fee-shifting
provisions. The unintended consequence of these features is
that SLAPP filers can often elude the protections of antiSLAPP statutes by filing suit in federal court, where Federal
Rules of Procedure displace conflicting state law. Unlike
other states’ anti-SLAPP statutes, however, Florida’s version—when read properly—does not conflict with the Federal Rules of Procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
At the tail end of the 1980s, two University of Denver professors
noticed a “disturbing” trend—some citizens were using lawsuits to
prevent others from or punish others for speaking out. 1 The professors called those suits “SLAPPs,” short for Strategic Lawsuits
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12
U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 938 (1992); see also Penelope Canan et al., Using
Law Ideologically: The Conflict Between Economic and Political Liberty, 8 J.L.
& POLS. 539, 539–40 (1992).
1
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Against Public Participation. 2 A lawsuit, the Supreme Court has
said, can be “a powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation” because, no matter how frivolous the suit is, the defendant must retain
counsel and “incur substantial legal fees to defend against it.” 3 The
suit’s ultimate consequence is its “chilling effect” on the defendant’s
willingness to continue the activity that gave rise to that suit. 4
Though SLAPPs come in many flavors—libel, zoning, and tortious
interference, for example—they all arise from the target’s 5 protected
First Amendment activity. 6
In response to this trend, many states enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. 7 For the most part, these statutes combat SLAPPs by (1) giving
targets the ability to file motions to dismiss or strike early in the
litigation process; (2) obliging courts to hear these motions quickly
and staying discovery in the meantime; (3) requiring the filer to
show that their case has merit; and/or (4) imposing cost-shifting
sanctions that award fees and costs if the filer cannot meet that burden. 8 At the same time, these mechanisms can make federal
courts—where Federal Rules of Procedure displace conflicting state
laws 9—a safe harbor for SLAPP filers. 10 Most Courts of Appeals
hold that various iterations of the anti-SLAPP statute conflict with

Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 939.
Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740–41 (1983).
4
Id. at 741.
5
SLAPP parties are best described in terms of “filers” and “targets,” rather
than plaintiffs and defendants. See Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 942 n.11.This
is because SLAPPs arise in many contexts, including counterclaims, in which case
the “target” is really the plaintiff. Id.
6
Id. at 946–47.
7
See State Anti-SLAPP Laws Reference Chart, PUB. PARTICIPATION
PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021) (listing states that currently have anti-SLAPP statutes and rating
the protections of each).
8
Issues Memorandum from Lane Shetterly, Chair, Robert T. Sherwin, Rep.
& Pub. Participation Prot. Act Drafting Comm. to the Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on
Unif. State L. 3 (June 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/7LCX-WNB9 [hereinafter Memorandum from Shetterly].
9
See infra Section I.A.
10
See infra Section II.B.
2
3
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the Federal Rules of Procedure and therefore do not apply in a federal court. 11
Florida first enacted an anti-SLAPP statute in 2000, 12 but that
law applied only to suits filed by state actors. 13 Because of its narrow scope, the statute saw little action during its effective period. 14
All that changed in 2015 when Florida amended its anti-SLAPP statute to include suits brought by a “person.” 15 Although Florida’s statute lacks many of the procedural mechanisms found in other states’
statutes, 16 the law still contains a handy tool for combatting
SLAPPs 17: a fee-shifting provision that entitles SLAPP targets to
attorney’s fees and costs when a filer’s suit violates the statute. 18
11
See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC., 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (D.C.); La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2020) (California);
Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 2019) (Texas); Carbone v. Cable
News Network, 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018) (Georgia); see also infra
Part II.
12
Citizen Participation in Government Act, 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2000174 (West) (formerly codified at Fla. Stat. § 768.295).
13
Id. (“No governmental entity in this state shall file or cause to be
filed . . . .”).
14
Samuel J. Morley, Florida’s Expanded Anti-SLAPP Law: More Protection
for Targeted Speakers, 90 FLA. B.J. 17, 18 (2016) (suggesting that government
entities “‘hardly, if ever,’” filed SLAPP suits).
15
See 2015 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2015-70 (West) (codified as Fla. Stat. §
768.295).
16
See Morley, supra note 14, at 18 (“Unlike many states, Florida’s version
does not contain any special burden shifting, burden of proof, motion to strike, or
discovery provisions to help flesh out the details of SLAPP dismissals.”).
17
See, e.g., David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The
Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1212 (1995) (arguing
that fee shifting is a “possible solution” for the “chilling effect” of litigation expenses on media defendants in frivolous suits); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal
Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662–
63 (1982) (positing that fee-shifting is “sound” when socially desirable litigation
would otherwise be uneconomical for a prospective party); Robert V. Percival &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation,
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 241 (1984) (“Fee shifting is designed to remove
some of the disincentives facing public interest litigants, thus increasing access to
the courts for groups who otherwise might be unrepresented or underrepresented.”).
18
See FLA. STAT. ANN. 768.295(4) (West 2015) (“The court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a
claim that an action was filed in violation of this section.”). That said, victories
for SLAPP targets under Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute are hard to come by. See
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And that matters. David Boies presents evidence that more than
ninety percent of all litigation expenses for defamation suits go to
legal fees and related expenses. 19 Similarly, Florida’s Office of the
Attorney General reviewed twenty-one SLAPPs filed in Florida between 1983 and 1993 and found that the costs of defending some of
those suits surpassed six figures. 20 While larger media corporations
might be able to afford such a bill, most SLAPPs target middle-class
Americans, many of whom are first-time activists. 21
This Note seeks to establish that, when given its proper meaning,
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not conflict with the Federal
Rules of Procedure. Part I, therefore, outlines the framework for addressing putative conflicts between Federal Rules of Procedure and
state laws. Part II then discusses the different approaches that the
courts of appeals have taken when applying that framework to putative conflicts between Federal Rules and certain states’ anti-SLAPP
statutes. Because such conflicts turn on a construction of the Federal
Rules and the relevant state’s statute, Part III attempts to give Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute its proper meaning. That Part begins by
discussing the statute’s text before discussing the case law that, although sparse, has interpreted the law to this point. Finally, Part IV
concludes by applying the framework for putative conflicts between
Federal Rules and state laws to the interpretation of Florida’s antiSLAPP statute outlined in Part III. And that yields the conclusion
that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not conflict with the Federal
Rules and therefore applies in federal court. 22
Zach Schlein, Miami Lawyers Win Rare Victory in Anti-SLAPP Case, LAW.COM
(Oct. 23, 2018, 1:51 PM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/10/23
/miami-lawyers-win-rare-victory-in-anti-slapp-case/.
19
Boies, supra note 17, at 1207.
20
See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., ISSUE BRIEF ON STRATEGIC LAWSUITS
AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, S. 2009-332, 2008 Sess., at 2 (Fla. 2008) (citing
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH, STRATEGIC
LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPPS) IN FLORIDA: SURVEY AND
REPORT 2 (1993)), https://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Committees/Publicat
ions/InterimWorkProgram/2009/pdf/2009-332ju.pdf.
21
Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 940.
22
The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed an order awarding attorneys’ fees to a
SLAPP target under Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F.
App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir. 2020). But the court explicitly declined to address the
issue analyzed in this Note—that Florida’s anti-SLAPP Statute applies in federal
court—because the SLAPP filer failed to raise the argument below and thus
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I.

CHOOSING BETWEEN FEDERAL PROCEDURAL LAW AND
STATE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
As most first-year law students will tell you, federal courts must
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law when sitting
in diversity jurisdiction. 23 Two federal statutes produce that deceivingly simple proposition. 24 The first, the Rules Enabling Act, empowers the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure” to be used in federal courts provided that such rules
do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 25 When
faced with a Federal Rule of Procedure that seemingly conflicts with
a state’s “substantive” law, the threshold question is whether the
Federal Rule is “sufficiently broad” to collide with the state law. 26
If so, the Federal Rule applies unless it is invalid under the Rules
Enabling Act, which occurs when the Rule abridges, enlarges, or
modifies a substantive right, or when the Rule cannot be “rationally”
forfeited it on appeal. Id. (citing Tannenbaum v. United States, 142 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). But see Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310,
1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“Florida’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision does
not conflict with any Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus may apply in a
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction.”); Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc.,
519 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1128 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (applying Bongino), appeal docketed, No. 21-10480 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021). On appeal, Corsi argues that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with the Federal Rules, see Appellant’s Initial
Brief at 16–19, Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., No. 21-10480 (11th Cir. July 28,
2021), setting the stage for the Eleventh Circuit to decide the question addressed
in this Note.
23
E.g., Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 65, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the State.”); Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)
(“[F]ederal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”).
24
See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 57 (2d ed. 2019), Westlaw FPP DESKBOOK (“No
issue in the whole field of federal jurisprudence has been more difficult than determining the meaning of [the Rules of Decision Act].”). Adding insult to injury,
at least one judge has complained of a “headache” when discussing the Supreme
Court’s most recent decision in this area. Oral Argument at 9:08, Abbas v. Foreign
Pol’y Grp., 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-7171),
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2015.nsf/363F50B1AF33E8BC85257D770055EC2E/$file/13-7171.mp3.
25
28 U.S.C. § 2072.
26
See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (quoting
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50, 750 n.9 (1980)).
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classified as procedural. 27 If the Federal Rule and state law do not
conflict—or if they do conflict, but the Federal Rule is invalid—the
second statute, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 steps in and adjures federal courts to apply state law. 29 Therefore, the crux of the issue in
most cases is whether a Federal Rule and a state law conflict. 30
A.

Determining Whether a Federal Rule and a State Law
Conflict
Because the Supreme Court has employed an array of methods
to interpret competing Federal Rules and state laws, the approach
for analyzing potential conflicts between Federal Rules and state
laws is less than clear. 31 The Court’s most recent decision on this
Id. at 5 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472). The Supreme Court has yet to
render a Federal Rule invalid under the Rules Enabling Act. See Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (plurality
opinion). Indeed, the requirement that the Supreme Court report the Rule to Congress for a period of review before the Rule takes effect, 28 U.S.C. § 2074, in
tandem with the Advisory Committee’s, Judicial Conference’s, and Supreme
Court’s study and approval of each Federal Rule of Procedure cloaks those Rules
with a presumption of validity. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 6.
28
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (corresponds to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34,
1 Stat. 73, 92).
29
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 65, 71, 78 (1938).
30
See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal
Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV.
707, 737 (2006) (“That leaves conflicts between the Federal Rules and state law
as the principal arena in which controversies persist under the Erie doctrine.”);
Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Starting Points: The Potential of Default Rules in Structuring
Choice of Law Analysis, 10 J.L. ECON & POL’Y 125, 146–47 (2013) (“The scope
of a federal rule is often the central disputed issue in Erie cases . . . .”).
31
See Joshua P. Zoffer, Note, An Avoidance Canon for Erie: Using Federalism to Resolve Shady Grove’s Conflicts Analysis Problem, 128 YALE L.J. 482,
492–93 (2018) (documenting seventy years of “confusing and contradictory approaches to conflicts analysis” that “eventually culminated in Shady Grove’s three
conflicting tests.”). Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
427 n.7 (1996) (citing Walker, 446 U.S. at 750–52) (“Federal courts have interpreted the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”), and id. at 437 n.22 (ceding that Rule 59 provides a vehicle for
challenging excessiveness of jury’s verdict, but arguing that state law supplies the
answer to whether damages are excessive), with id. at 468 & n.12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that state law supplies an answer to whether damages are excessive, but arguing that Rule 59 supplies the vehicle for challenging excessiveness of jury’s verdict).
27
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point is Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 32 which contains three opinions, each embodying a different interpretive approach to competing Federal Rules and state
laws. 33
Shady Grove arose after a class of plaintiffs sued Allstate in federal court to recover statutory interest after Allstate failed to make
timely payments on insurance claims. 34 At issue was a potential conflict between a New York statute, 35 which precludes class actions in
lawsuits that seek penalties such as statutory interest, and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 36 which permits a class action as long
as certain conditions are satisfied. 37 In other words, the New York
law precludes a class action when Rule 23 would otherwise permit
one. For that reason, five justices agreed that the two conflicted and
that Rule 23 displaced New York’s law. 38 More important than that
holding, however, are the competing interpretive approaches employed by the three opinions. 39
559 U.S. 393 (2010).
See Ralph U. Whitten, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: Justice Whitten, Nagging in Part and Declaring a Pox on All
Houses, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 125 (2010) (“Combined with its failure to
establish an appropriate and consistent method for interpreting Federal Rules to
determine whether they conflict with state law, the Court leaves the fundamental,
threshold question under the Erie doctrine in a state of incoherence. The result has
and will continue to be chaos in the lower federal courts . . . .”).
34
559 U.S. at 397.
35
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (“Unless a statute . . . specifically authorizes the recovery [of a penalty or statutory damages] in
a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery
created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.” (emphasis
added)).
36
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue . . .
if: [four conditions are met].”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (emphasis added) (providing
that a class action “may be maintained” if Rule 23(a) is satisfied).
37
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 396.
38
Id. at 411; see also id. at 416, 429–31 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing
that Rule 23 displaces New York’s law).
39
The opinion also embodies three distinct approaches to testing the validity
of a Federal Rule under the Rules Enabling Act. See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady
Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25–52 (2010); Zoffer, supra note 31, at 499–503.
Because this Note posits that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not collide with
any Federal Rule, that analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.
32
33
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Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Scalia employed a
rigid, textualist approach, concluding that the New York “statute’s
clear text” prohibited a class action when Rule 23 permitted one. 40
He therefore brushed aside the argument that Federal Rules should
be read with “sensitivity to important state interests” to avoid conflicts with a state law. 41 Though Justice Scalia admitted that an ambiguous Federal Rule should be read to avoid “substantial variations” in outcomes between state and federal litigation, 42 he concluded that a Federal Rule’s text could not be contorted under any
circumstance. 43
In a dissent that also garnered four votes, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the Court’s long history of “vigilantly” reading the Federal
Rules to avoid a conflict with state laws. 44 Unlike Justice Scalia, she
focused on the purposes underlying Rule 23 and New York’s law,
positing that while “[t]he fair and efficient conduct of class litigation” is the concern of Rule 23, the “remedy for an infraction of state
law . . . is the legitimate concern of the State’s lawmakers and not
of the federal rulemakers.” 45 In other words, Justice Ginsburg read
New York’s law to place a “limitation” on the kinds of remedies
available to class action plaintiffs. 46 Because Rule 23 “does not
command that a particular remedy be available” for a class, she
thought the conflict was avoidable. 47 In essence, the task as she saw
it was to approach putative conflicts with greater deference to important state policies. 48
That leaves Justice Stevens’ concurrence as the swing vote. Like
the dissent, Justice Stevens embraced the principle that courts
should interpret a federal rule with “sensitivity” to important state

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 403, 405–06 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 405 n.7.
42
Id. (quoting Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504
(2001)).
43
See id. at 405–06.
44
See id. at 439–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
46
Id. at 444–45.
47
Id. at 446
48
See id. at 459 (“I would continue to approach Erie questions in a manner
mindful of the purposes underlying the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act, faithful to precedent, and respectful of important state interests.”).
40
41
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interests and regulatory policies. 49 He, too, believed that courts
should avoid “immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that
would trench” on state policies. 50 But he also agreed with Justice
Scalia, explaining that courts may not “rewrite” the Federal Rules
under any circumstance. 51 In the end, an unavoidable conflict existed between the two provisions in his mind, leaving the central
disagreement between him and the dissent about “the degree to
which the meaning of federal rules may be contorted . . . to accommodate state policy goals.” 52
In sum, Justice Scalia’s opinion yields an approach to the conflicts analysis that is the least deferential to state laws. For that reason, this Note applies Justice Scalia’s approach to the conflict analysis below in an effort to show that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute
steers clear of competing Federal Rules—even under the most stringent analysis.
B.
The Analysis When No Conflict Exists: Erie’s Twin Aims
When the relevant Federal Rule and state law do not conflict, the
analysis proceeds to a second step. 53 This step finds its roots in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 where the Supreme Court retired its
earlier decision in Swift v. Tyson 55 and held that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction to
apply the states’ substantive law. 56 The “twin aims” of Erie were (1)
to avoid the unfairness that arises when the result or character of
litigation differs simply because the suit had been brought in a federal court and (2) to discourage the practice of forum-shopping that
had arisen under Swift. 57 The problem is, the line between substance
and procedure is often “hazy.” 58 The Court grasped that in Guaranty
Id. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 430 (quoting id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
51
Id. at 431.
52
Id. at 422 n.5.
53
See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–70 (1965); Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 445 U.S. 740, 752–53 (1980).
54
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
56
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80.
57
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
58
Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring); see also John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 735 (1974) (“With York four
49
50
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Trust Co. v. York 59 when it sidelined “abstractions regarding ‘substance and ‘procedure’” in favor of a test that would apply state laws
if they “significantly affect” the outcome of a suit. 60 Applying that
test, the Court paved the way for a flurry of state laws to operate in
federal courts. 61
When the overbreadth of York’s outcome-determinative test became apparent, so too did its inevitable reverberation. 62 That reverberation came in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc. when the Court confronted a conflict between federal and state
law about the division of responsibility between judge and jury. 63
After announcing the presence of countervailing federal interests, 64
the Byrd Court framed the question as a balancing test: whether the
federal policy outweighs the states’ interest in avoiding different
outcomes in federal and state courts. 65
Finally, in Hanna v. Plummer, 66 the Court explained that its
prior cases show that choices between state and federal law cannot

years in the future, the Court was still operating on the assumption that the Rules
of Decision Act divided legal problems into two separate piles market ‘substance’
and ‘procedure’ . . . .”).
59
326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (citation omitted) (“Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending
upon the particular problem for which it is used.”).
60
Id. at 109.
61
See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202–04
(1956) (analyzing a state law governing enforceability of arbitration provisions);
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–56 (1949) (analyzing
a statute requiring derivative plaintiffs to make bond payments for maintenance
of derivative actions); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 535–38
(1949) (analyzing a statute affecting which corporations may bring state law
claims); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532–34
(1949) (analyzing a statute governing tolling for purposes of statute of limitations).
62
Ely, supra note 58, at 709. Once it became clear that York’s test controlled
not only judge-made rules, but also “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and even
other federal statutes as well, some sort of backlash was inevitable.” Id.
63
356 U.S. 525, 534 (1958). The Seventh Amendment is one of the few Bill
of Rights that does not apply in state courts. See McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (incorporation doctrine).
64
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
65
Id. at 538.
66
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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be made by any axiomatic criterion. 67 Rather, those choices turn on
the two policies underlying Erie: discouraging forum shopping and
avoiding unfairness. 68 And when those two policies favor applying
the state law—such that the failure to apply the state law would trigger unfairness or forum shopping—the state law will apply absent
the presence of some countervailing federal interest. 69
II.

THE FATE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
Shady Grove’s failure to deliver a single approach for analyzing
putative conflicts has led to disparate results in the lower courts. 70
Some courts turn to Justice Scalia’s approach 71 while others look to
Justice Stevens’s, interpreting the Federal Rules with sensitivity to
“important state interests.” 72 With that said, the prevailing view in
the courts of appeals is now that many versions of the anti-SLAPP
statute collide with Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56. 73 This Part examines both sides of that split to show how the putative conflict analysis works in the context of anti-SLAPP statutes.
Id. at 467.
Id.
69
The occasions in which a countervailing justification has outweighed the
policies underlying the Erie rule are few and far between. Even so, the language
appears in the Court’s decisions, old and new. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980); Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humans. Inc., 418 U.S. 415, 432
(1996); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
439 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70
See Jack E. Pace III & Rachel J. Feldman, From Shady to Dark: One Year
Later, Shady Grove’s Meaning Remains Unclear, 25 ANTITRUST 75, 78–80
(2011) (recapping lower courts’ incongruent approaches when applying Shady
Grove).
71
See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95 n.7 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting
a claim that Justice Stevens’ concurrence governs the analysis for putative conflicts).
72
In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (E.D. Pa.
2010) (rejecting Justice Scalia’s approach and quoting Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
for the notion that five justices agreed “that Federal Rules should be read with
moderation in diversity suits to accommodate important state concerns.”); accord
McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (internal
citations omitted) (finding that Justice Stevens was “the crucial fifth vote” and
thus adopting his approach to putative conflicts).
73
See infra Section II.B.
67
68
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A.
Godin v. Schencks (The Minority’s Approach)
The First Circuit was among the first courts of appeals to address
a putative conflict in the wake of Shady Grove. In Godin v.
Schencks, the court held that neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor Rule 56 “answer the same question” as Maine’s anti-SLAPP 74 statute. 75 In so
doing, the Godin court reasoned Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute does
not supplant Rules 12 and 56 as much as it supplements those rules
in cases arising from a target’s First Amendment activity. 76 The
court then read Rule 12(b)(6) narrowly, suggesting that it merely
provides a mechanism to test the sufficiency of a complaint. 77 But
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, according to the court, creates a separate basis for dismissal if the filer cannot satisfy Maine’s special
rules for suits arising from First Amendment activities. 78 In the same
way, the First Circuit suggested that Rule 56 merely creates a process for parties to secure a pretrial judgment absent disputed material facts. 79 By contrast, it read Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to serve
“the entirely distinct function” of combating SLAPPs. 80 The court
further explained that Maine’s statute allocates the burden of proof,
which neither Rule 12 nor Rule 56 do. 81 “And it is long settled that
the allocation of burden of proof is substantive in nature and controlled by state law.” 82 Relying on Justice Stevens’s Shady Grove
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012).
629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 89.
78
Id.
79
Id. The Godin court apparently thought that an inherent feature of Rule 56
“is that a fact-finder’s evaluation of material factual disputes is not required.” Id.
This seemingly contradicts the summary judgment standard. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“summary judgment will not lie if the
dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”).
80
Godin, 629 F.3d at 89.
81
Id.
82
Id. (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943)). The court’s reliance on Palmer seems inapposite, however. Although Palmer indeed holds that
state law allocates the burden of proving contributory negligence, that holding
applies only to the burden of proof at trial. 318 U.S. at 117. In fact, the losing
party argued that Rule 8(c), which makes contributory negligence an affirmative
defense, allocated the burden of proof at trial. Id. Rejecting this argument, the
Court explained that “Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading.” Id. The
74
75
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concurrence, the First Circuit concluded that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56
could not displace Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute because the latter effectively defines the scope of the state-created right. 83
Perhaps the most vulnerable part of the First Circuit’s analysis
pertains to the putative conflict between Maine’s discovery-staying
mechanism and Rule 56. 84 For starters, the court assumed that Rule
56 provides a mechanism for litigants to circumvent a fact-finder’s
evaluation of factual disputes. 85 Rule 56 does just that, to be sure. 86
It does so, however, only after a litigant supports their summary
judgment motion by citing an evidentiary record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, declarations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. 87
The development of a “record” is thus implicit in Rule 56’s mechanism for bypassing a fact-finder’s evaluation of the facts. Yet
Maine’s statute automatically stays discovery upon the filing of a
special motion, 88 thus impeding the development of a record.
Court later referenced that part of the Palmer opinion as an example of a case
when the “scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party
urged . . . .” Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). By negative implication, Rule 8 is broad enough to control the allocation of the burden at the pleading
stage.
83
Godin, 629 F.3d at 89.
84
See Zoffer, supra note 31, at 541 (suggesting it is “implausible to arrive at
any reading that allows discovery-staying provisions” to operate concomitantly
with Rule 56). One might also plausibly argue that the First Circuit’s reading of
Rule 12(b)(6)—that it leaves room for a supplemental state device—is unpersuasive. Rule 12(d) does indeed provide that a motion for judgment on the pleadings
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 when the court considers matters outside the pleadings. So, the Rules contemplate that a claim will
be assessed on the pleadings alone or under the summary judgment standard, leaving no room for another device to test the sufficiency of a claim on a pretrial motion to dismiss. See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1351
(11th Cir. 2018) (suggesting that Rules 12 and 56 leave “no room for any other
device for determining whether a valid claim supported by sufficient evidence to
avoid pretrial dismissal”); but see Zoffer, supra note 31, at 540 (suggesting that
“the text of Rule 12 can plausibly be read to create room for the operation” and
thus application of “anti-SLAPP special motion provisions.”).
85
Godin, 629 F.3d at 89; see also supra note 79.
86
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
87
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
88
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012).
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Wary of this, the First Circuit noted that Maine’s law allows a
court to order “specific discovery” if good cause is shown. 89 That
mechanism, the court said, dovetails with Rule 56(d), 90 which grants
courts latitude to defer a summary judgment motion and order more
discovery upon the nonmovant’s showing that it cannot present essential facts. 91 But this, too, misses the point: Rule 56 provides a
chance for discovery before a motion for summary judgment, 92
whereas the special motion procedure in Maine’s statute forces the
nonmovant to justify the need for discovery in the first place. 93
Forging ahead to the second step, the Godin court asked whether
applying Maine’s statute would best serve the two policies undergirding Erie. 94 Not only does the statute substantively alter a statecreated claim by shifting the burden and forcing the plaintiff to show
damages, but it also awards attorney’s fees to prevailing SLAPP targets. 95 The court held that declining to apply the statute would produce an “inequitable administration of justice” between state and
federal forums along with an incentive for SLAPP filers to forum
shop. 96
B.
The Majority’s Approach
Most federal courts of appeals to consider this issue have
shunned the First Circuit’s anemic interpretation of Federal Rules
12 and 56, 97 instead finding an unavoidable conflict exists between
those Rules and states’ anti-SLAPP statutes. 98 This trend began with
Godin, 629 F.3d at 90.
Id. at 90–91.
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).
92
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986) (“[summary judgment need] be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.”). Rule 56 is
quite clear on this point: A party moving for summary judgment “must support
the assertion by[] citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . .” FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
93
tit. 14, § 556.
94
Godin, 629 F.3d at 91.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 92.
97
See, e.g., Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1355–56
(11th Cir. 2018) (“We are not persuaded by the reasoning of [Godin].”).
98
To “prevent the collision of California state procedural rules with federal
procedural rules,” the Ninth Circuit applies the federal standards for dismissal and
89
90
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Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC, when the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia described D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute 99
as establishing “the circumstances under which a court must dismiss
a plaintiff’s claim before trial—namely, when the court concludes
that the plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success on the merits.” 100 Federal Rules 12 and 56 answer the same question, however. 101 And they do so differently. 102 As then-Judge Kavanaugh
explained, the Federal Rules “do not require a plaintiff to show a
likelihood of success on the merits.” 103 Instead, the Rules entitle a
plaintiff to a trial when they overcome the standards embodied by
those Rules, both of which differ from and are less difficult than the
likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits standard. 104 In effect, D.C’s
anti-SLAPP statute sets up another hurdle for a plaintiff to get to
trial, a feature that “conflicts” with Rules 12 and 56. 105
Even more to the point is the Eleventh Circuit’s explanation that
Rules 8, 12, and 56 “provide a comprehensive framework governing
pretrial dismissal and judgment.” 106 In Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit declined to apply Georgia’s antiSLAPP statute, 107 which contains a special motion-to-strike
summary judgment when faced with a California anti-SLAPP motion. See
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 80 F.3d 890,
833 (9th Cir. 2018). But the Ninth Circuit declines to apply California’s discovery-staying mechanisms because they collide with Rule 56. See Metabolic Int’l,
Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001). But this line of cases is not
without its critics. See Makeaff v. Trump Univ., LLC 715 F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir.
2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (urging court to reconsider cases applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute because “[f]ederal courts have no business applying
exotic state procedural rules which, of necessity, disrupt the comprehensive
scheme embodied in the Federal Rules”); Makeaff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d
1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) (Waterford, J., dissenting from denial of petition for
rehearing en banc) (“California’s anti-SLAPP statute impermissibly supplements
the Federal Rules’ criteria for pre-trial dismissal of an action.”).
99
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5501–5505 (West 2012).
100
783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.).
101
Id. at 1333–34.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1334–35.
105
Id. at 1334.
106
Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir.
2018).
107
Id. at 1350.

2021]

SLAPPING BACK IN FEDERAL COURT

361

procedure that requires the nonmoving party to show there is a
“probability” that they will prevail on their claim. 108 After asking
whether the Federal Rules in question were broad enough to control
the disputed issue—the standard under which a pretrial dismissal
must be tested—the court held that conflict with Rules 8, 12, and 56
was inevitable. 109
The Fifth Circuit addressed Texas’ anti-SLAPP statute using a
similar analysis. 110 When triggered, the Texas anti-SLAPP statute
imposes a complex, multi-layered burden-shifting framework. 111
The statute also contains a “clear and specific evidence” standard,
which a SLAPP filer must meet when a target uses the statute’s special motion. 112 But, again, those mechanisms collide with the comprehensive pretrial framework embodied by Rules 8, 12, and 56. 113
And so those Rules supply the applicable standards and procedures
for a pretrial motion to dismiss or summary judgment. 114
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit applies Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP
statute, 115 even though that, too, embodies a “probability of success
on the claim” standard for testing special anti-SLAPP motions. 116
That said, Louisiana courts interpret the “probability of success”
standard to be “closely in line” with the standard for summary
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2016).
Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1355. See also supra note 84.
110
See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 244–47 (5th Cir. 2019).
111
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–27.011 (West 2019).
If a target triggers that statute with a special motion and establishes that the claim
relates to his or her First Amendment Activity, id. at § 27.005(b)(1)–(3), the nonmoving party must present “clear and specific evidence” that they can meet each
element of their claim. Id. at § 27.005(c). Even if the nonmoving party carries that
burden, a court must strike his or her claim if the moving party (the target) establishes an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at §
27.005(d). All the while, the court must stay discovery absent a showing of good
cause. Id. at §§ 27.003(c), 27.006(b).
112
See supra note 111.
113
Klocke, 936 F.3d at 245, 247.
114
Id.
115
See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 181–82 (5th
Cir. 2009) (before Shady Grove); see also Lozovyy v. Kurtz, 813 F.3d 576, 582–
83 (5th Cir. 2015) (declining to revisit Henry’s analysis of Louisiana’s antiSLAPP statute after Shady Grove and assuming the statute does not conflict with
the Federal Rules); Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2016) (same).
116
LA. STAT. ANN. § 971 (2012).
108
109
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judgment under Rule 56. 117 The conflict between Louisiana’s antiSLAPP law and the Federal Rules is therefore “less obvious” than
that between Texas’ and the Federal Rules. 118
III.
FLORIDA’S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE
Although multiple district courts have held that Florida’s antiSLAPP statute 119 applies in federal court, 120 neither the Eleventh
Circuit nor any other circuit has addressed this question. 121 The
overarching theme of this Note is that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute
does not conflict with any Federal Rules and therefore applies in
federal court. 122 Hopefully, this analysis of Florida’s anti-SLAPP
statute is helpful for jurists and practitioners alike. To do so, this
Part first analyzes the statute’s meaning before turning to the case
law that, although sparse, has addressed the statute to this point.
A.
The Text
By its terms, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute realizes a “fundamental state policy” by prohibiting lawsuits incompatible with the First
Amendment right to speak freely on public issues. 123 It does so by
precluding persons and government entities from filing certain suits,
claims, crossclaims, and counterclaims that undermine public participation. 124 At the statute’s core is a fee-shifting provision that entitles the “prevailing party” to fees and costs when a target claims
See Lozovyy, 813 F.3d at 585–86.
Klocke, 936 F.4d at 248–49.
119
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2015).
120
See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1324 (S.D. Fla.
2020); Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (S.D. Fla. 2021)
(applying Bongino), appeal docketed, No. 21-10480 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2021).
But see Appellant’s Initial Brief at 16–19, Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., No. 2110480 (11th Cir. July 28, 2021) (arguing that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore does not apply in
federal court).
121
See supra note 22.
122
See infra Part IV.
123
§ 768.295(1).
124
See § 768.295(3) (“A person or governmental entity in this state may not
file . . . any . . . claim . . . against another person . . . primarily because such person . . . has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue . . . .” (emphasis added)).
117
118
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that a lawsuit violates the statute’s terms. 125 Whether a suit in fact
violates the statute turns on three elements: a filer’s suit must be (1)
meritless, and (2) primarily caused by (3) the target’s protected
speech. 126 The statute also specifies the procedural mechanisms that
SLAPP targets can use to trigger the statute’s fee-shifting provision—a motion to dismiss, a motion for final judgment, and a motion for summary judgment. 127 This Section addresses each aspect
separately.
1. THE “FREE SPEECH IN CONNECTION WITH A PUBLIC ISSUE”
AND “WITHOUT MERIT” REQUIREMENTS
For the statute to apply, the target’s protected speech must be the
primary cause of the filer’s claim. 128 When analyzing similar language found in other states’ anti-SLAPP statutes, courts focus on the
facts supporting the filer’s theory of liability to see if those facts
arise from the target’s protected speech. 129 So too has the Eleventh
Circuit employed this approach when interpreting Florida’s antiSLAPP statute. 130
The predecessor to Florida’s current statute throws light on the
nexus required to satisfy the statute’s “primarily because” language. 131 That version required that the target’s speech be the sole
cause of the filer’s claim. 132 The current version therefore relaxes
§ 768.295(4) (“The court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a claim that an action was filed in
violation of this section.”).
126
§ 768.295(3).
127
§ 768.295(4).
128
Id. (“A person . . . may not file . . . any lawsuit . . . against another person . . . primarily because such person . . . exercised the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue . . . .”(emphasis added)).
129
See Morley, supra note 14, at 22.
130
Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that
a plaintiff’s defamation suit “arose out of” the defendant’s protected First Amendment Activity, publishing a news report on a matter of public concern in violation
of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute (emphasis added)). In that opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit explicitly declined to address whether Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. Id.
131
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 256–60 (2012) (“[A] change in the language
of a prior statute presumably connotes a change in meaning.”).
132
See 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2000-174 (West).
125
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the nexus requirement between the filer’s cause of action and the
target’s protected speech. 133 It stands to reason that, in most cases,
courts can analyze that nexus by looking at the facts that support the
filer’s theory of liability.
The statute’s next element is the phrase: “speech in connection
with a public issue,” which the statute defines to mean any statement
made (a) before a government entity 134 about an issue that a government entity is considering or reviewing or (b) in connection with an
array of multimedia, including plays, movies, television, radio
broadcasts, audiovisual works, books, magazine articles, musical
works, and news reports. 135 As for the former, speech made before
a government entity in relation to an issue under consideration or
review is inherently connected to a public issue. 136 The requirement
that the speech relates to an “issue under consideration or review”
thus supplants any requirement that the speech be connected to a
public issue. Similarly, the law does not require that speech relate to
a public issue when that speech is made in connection with one of
the listed forms of media. 137 This simplifies the matter: when the
See also FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 1041, 2015 Sess. (Fla. 2015),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015/1041/Analyses/h1041z1.CJS.PDF
(“The bill also provides that a meritless suit is a SLAPP suit if brought primarily
because of the exercise of rights protected by the Act, rather than solely because
of the exercise of such rights, which is a less rigorous standard than current law.”).
134
A government entity refers to the State, including the three branches of
government, the municipalities, corporations acting as instrumentalities for the
state and municipalities, and any agencies thereof. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.295(2)(b) (West 2015).
135
See id. § 768.295(2)(a).
136
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (“Thus we
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government . . . .”).
137
Though this proposition follows from the statute’s clear, unambiguous language, see § 768.295(2)(a) (defining free speech in connection with public issues
as “any written or oral statement that is protected under applicable law and is
made . . . in connection with a play, movie, television program, radio broadcast,
audiovisual work, book, magazine article, musical work, news report, or other
similar work”), the legislative history shows that the Legislature was aware of this
meaning when the bill passed. See COMM. ON RULES, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1312, 2015 Sess. (Fla. 2015), https://www.flsenate.gov
/Session/Bill/2015/1312/Analyses/2015s1312.rc.PDF.
133
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SLAPP target’s speech takes either form, the speech is per se connected to a public issue within the statute’s plain meaning. 138
Finally, the filer’s suit not only needs to arise from the target’s
protected speech, it also must be “without merit” to fall within the
statute’s ambit. 139 This is where Florida’s statute departs from the
pack. Most states’ anti-SLAPP statutes test a suit’s merit using a
heightened standard, requiring, for example, a SLAPP filer to
demonstrate that a claim is likely to succeed on the merits 140 or establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each of
the claim’s essential elements. 141
Shedding light on Florida’s standard, the Florida Supreme Court
has used a “without merit” standard to test a complaint’s legal sufficiency on a motion to dismiss, finding that standard was met in
“the absence of sufficient facts to make a good claim or to state a
cause of action.” 142 In general, if a statute uses words or phrases that
have already received authoritative construction by that jurisdiction’s court of last resort, those words “are to be understood according to that construction.” 143 The question, then, is how a SLAPP
target triggers the statute.

By reducing uncertainty and thus litigation about the types of speech that
relate to a “public issue,” the statute fulfills its stated intent—for the courts to
“expeditiously dispose[]” of such suits. See § 768.295(1); see also SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 131, at 217–20 (“A preamble, purpose clause, or recital is a
permissible indicator of meaning.”).
139
See § 768.295(3) (“A person . . . may not file . . . any lawsuit . . . against
another person . . . without merit and primarily because such person . . . exercised
the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue . . . .”(emphasis added)).
140
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012).
141
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005 (West 2019); see also CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015) (requiring a filer to establish “that there
is a probability that [they] will prevail on the claim.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-1111.1 (West 2016) (requiring a filer to establish that “there is a probability that
[they] will prevail on the claim.”).
142
See Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 175 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1965)
(noting that the standards for a motion to dismiss under Florida’s Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are “the same”).
143
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 322.
138
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2. THE PROCEDURE FOR INVOKING FLORIDA’S ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTE
When the Florida Legislature amended its anti-SLAPP statute in
2015, it expanded the statute’s coverage to claims brought by private
persons, 144 but left the procedures alluded to in the former version
untouched. 145 Early drafts of the former version included a discovery-staying mechanism, a burden-shifting framework, and a “clear
and convincing evidence” standard. 146 But both chambers of Florida’s Legislature ultimately expressed concern 147 that such procedures would violate the separation of powers provision in the Florida
Constitution. 148 For that reason, the Florida Legislature scrapped
that version in favor of the one it enacted, 149 which lacks any such

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Compare Citizen Participation in Government Act, 2000 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 2000-174 (West), with Fla. Stat. § 768.295.
146
See S.B. 308-671-00, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000), http://archive.
flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0306c1.pdf; H. R. B.
565-171-00, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session
/2000/House/bills/billtext/pdf/h0135.pdf.
147
See generally STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT &
PRODUCTIVITY, STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 306,
2000 Leg. Sess., at 3–6 (Fla. 2000), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/
Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB0306.go.pdf; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 135, 2000 Leg. Sess., at 7–8 (Fla. 2000),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2000/135/Analyses/20000135HGG_HB0
135A.GG.pdf; see also S. Res. 306, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (enacted as recommended by Sen. Comm. On Gov’t Oversight & Productivity), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/Senate/bills/amendments/pdf/sb0306c1455
042.pdf.
148
See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“The powers of the state government shall be
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to
one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the branches unless
expressly provided herein.”); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (empowering Florida’s
Supreme Court to proclaim rules of practice and procedure).
149
See generally STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT &
PRODUCTIVITY, 2000 Leg. Sess., Rep. on CS/SB 306, at 3–6 (Fla. 2000), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB0306.go.pdf; S.
Res. 306, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (enacted as recommended by Sen. Comm.
on Gov’t Oversight & Productivity), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/
2000/Senate/bills/amendments/pdf/sb0306c1455042.pdf.
144
145

2021]

SLAPPING BACK IN FEDERAL COURT

367

discovery-staying mechanism, burden-shifting framework, or “clear
and convincing evidence” standard. 150
Instead, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute instructs SLAPP targets to
file a motion for dismissal of the complaint, for final judgment, or
for summary judgment. 151 And if the target succeeds in such a motion, the statute awards the SLAPP target fees and costs, assuming
the statute covers the filer’s claim. 152 Though the statute is silent
about the procedures for the motions to dismiss and for final judgment, it expands on a motion for summary judgment: a SLAPP target “may file a motion for summary judgment, together with supplemental affidavits, seeking a determination that the [filer’s] lawsuit has been brought in violation of this section.” 153 The SLAPP
filer must then file a response with any supplemental affidavits, before the court “shall” expeditiously set a hearing on the motion. 154
See supra note 145; see also Morley, supra note 14, at 18, 23. But see infra,
pp. 32–33.
151
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(4) (West 2015). (“A person or entity
sued . . . in violation of this section has a right to an expeditious resolution of a
claim that the suit is in violation of this section. A person or entity may move the
court for an order dismissing the action or granting final judgment in favor of that
person or entity. The person or entity may file a motion for summary judgment,
together with supplemental affidavits, seeking a determination that the claimant’s . . . lawsuit has been brought in violation of this section . . . .”).
152
See id.; see also Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir.
2020) (holding that statute’s “plain language” supported the district court’s award
of attorney’s fees and costs to SLAPP target); Boling v. WFTV, LLC, No. 2017CA-6488, 2018 WL 2336159, at * 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 2018) (“Under the antiSLAPP law, an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs is mandatory [when
both elements are met].”). But see Berisha v. Lawson, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1157
n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (suggesting that SLAPP target entitled only to fees and costs
incurred in connection with special motion itself). The Berisha court’s reading is
not without the support of the statute’s language, which entitles the prevailing
party to fees and costs “incurred in connection with a claim that an action was
filed in violation of this section.” § 768.295(4) (emphasis added). On the other
hand, any attorney’s fees and costs incurred to establish that a filer’s claim is
“without merit,” are also arguably incurred in connection with a claim that the
filer’s action violated Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. And that reading is more consonant with the statute’s stated purpose—to protect Floridian’s right to speak
freely on public issues. See § 768.295(1); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
131, at 219 (asserting that a statute’s stated purpose suggests “which permissible
meanings of the enactment should be preferred.”).
153
§ 768.295(4).
154
Id.
150
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Save for the requirement that the court expeditiously set a hearing,
this procedure aligns with that for summary judgment under Florida’s Rules of Civil Procedure. 155
Viewed this way, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute creates no procedural mechanisms; it merely directs SLAPP targets to use the already-existing procedural mechanisms—a motion to dismiss, a motion for final judgment, or a motion for summary judgment—to test
the merits of the filer’s claim. 156 If any such motion is successful,
and if the filer’s claim arises “primarily” because the target engaged
in one of the two types of activities covered by the statute, 157 then
the target can recoup fees and costs. 158 The bottom line is that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute is merely a garden variety, fee-shifting provision that attaches to certain types of claims. 159 But not everyone
sees it this way.
B.

Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc.—(Mis)Interpreting Florida’s
Anti-SLAPP Statute
In Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., Florida’s Second District Court of
Appeal became the first Florida appellate court to elaborate on this
framework. 160 At issue in Gundel was the trial court’s refusal to consider supplemental affidavits filed with the SLAPP target’s all-encompassing motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, and motion for summary judgment. 161 Because the statute
“plainly authorizes” the filing of a motion for summary judgment
with supplemental affidavits, the appellate court held that the trial
See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(b) (A defending party “may move for a summary
judgment . . . at any time with or without supporting affidavits.”).
156
See § 768.295(4).
157
See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text.
158
§ 768.295(4).
159
See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323 (S.D. Fla.
2020) (“At bottom, Florida’s statute is a garden variety fee shifting provision,
which the Florida legislature enacted to accomplish a ‘fundamental state policy’—deterring SLAPP suits.”).
160
See generally Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., 264 So. 3d 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2019). But see WPB Residents for Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio 284
So. 3d 555, 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (splitting with Florida’s Second District
Court of Appeal on finality of an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss).
161
Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 309.
155
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court should have tested the motion as one for summary judgment. 162 The appellate court turned to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to define the contours of the summary judgment procedure. 163
In what amounts to dicta, 164 the appellate court also elaborated
on the statute’s motion to dismiss mechanism, first noting: “the statute is silent as to the burden or procedure for considering a motion
to dismiss.” 165 Even so, the court discerned that both burdens and
procedures adhere to the statute’s framework, as evidenced by its
purpose. 166 Explaining the presence of a burden-shifting framework, the court reasoned that the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss focuses not on whether a SLAPP filer sufficiently alleges a cause of
action but rather on whether a SLAPP filer’s cause of action arises
from the target’s protected activity. 167 In other words, the court understood the law to create a special motion. On that basis, the court
said the initial burden lies with the SLAPP target to establish that
Id. at 312–13. This, of course, makes sense because the statute grants discretion to the SLAPP target, providing that such person “may” file a motion for
summary judgment together with supplementary affidavits. § 768.295(4) (emphasis added); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 112 (noting that permissive words such as “may” grant discretion); cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010) (adopting an
analogous interpretation of Rule 23, which grants discretion to a litigant, not a
court, to maintain a class action).
163
Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 313.
164
E.g., Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009)) (“[D]icta is
defined as those portions of an opinion that are ‘not necessary to deciding the case
then before us[.]’”). Because the Gundel court needed only to decide that the trial
court should have treated the motion as one for summary judgment, its discussion
of the motion to dismiss mechanism is dicta. See Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 313.
165
Id. at 314.
166
Id.
167
Id. The court relied in part on the Maine Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Maine’s own anti-SLAPP statute. See id. (citing Schelling v. Lindell, 942 A.2d
1226, 1229 (Me. 2008)). Yet the Gundel court neglects the fact that Maine’s antiSLAPP statute explicitly contains a burden-shifting framework. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012) (“The court shall grant the special motion, unless
the party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party’s
exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or
any arguable basis in law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to
the responding party.”(emphasis added)). Florida’s framework, by contrast, contains no such language. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2015).
162
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the statute applies—i.e., that the target’s protected activity gives rise
to the filer’s suit. 168 The burden then shifts to the SLAPP filer to
establish that their claims have merit and do not arise “primarily”
because of the target’s protected speech. 169 On top of that, the court
asserted that the motion to dismiss entails consideration of matters
beyond the complaint—here, the supporting affidavit. 170
That reading of the motion to dismiss mechanism defies the statute’s text, however. For one, the statute explicitly authorizes a
SLAPP target to file a motion for summary judgment with affidavits, while the statute fails to mention supplemental materials in connection with a motion to dismiss. 171 To that end, if a court must consider an affidavit when appraising an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss,
as the Gundel court claims, 172 then the language entitling the parties
to submit “supplemental affidavits” on a summary judgment motion
is surplusage. 173 For another, the Gundel court failed to notice that
the statute necessarily applies when speech takes one of two forms:
(1) speech made before a governmental entity about issues under
review or (2) speech made in connection with the listed forms of
media. 174 In effect, this eclipses the Gundel court’s “initial burden,”
leaving only the SLAPP filer burdened with establishing that their

Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 314.
Id.
170
Id. at 314–15.
171
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(4) (West 2015); see also SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 131, at 93 (“The principle that a matter not covered is not
covered is so obvious that it seems absurd to recite it.”).
172
Interpreting Gundel, one trial court claimed three things to be true: (1)
plaintiffs faced with an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss have the burden to show
that their claims are not “without merit,” (2) courts need not accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true or draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,
and (3) courts may look beyond the four corners of the complaint. See Order
Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Florida’s Anti-Slapp Statute,
Fla. Stat. § 768.295, Lam v. Univision Commc’ns, Inc., (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2,
2019) (No. 2019-016891-CA-01), 2019 WL 6830882, at *2.
173
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 174 (“If possible, every word
and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be ignored. None
should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another
provision or to have no consequence.”).
174
See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text.
168
169
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claims have merit and do not arise “primarily” because of the target’s speech. 175
The statute’s text aside, Gundel’s interpretation of the antiSLAPP statute contravenes the Florida Constitution’s separation of
powers provision. 176 Not only does the legislative history counsel
against that construction, 177 but it is also a pillar of statutory interpretation that a statute should be construed “in a way that avoids
placing its constitutionality in doubt.” 178
Above all, the notion that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute contains
a special motion to dismiss 179 defies the statute’s ordinary meaning.
Indeed, the states’ whose statutes contain special motion procedures
define them explicitly. 180 Against that backdrop, Florida’s Legislature used language associated with three common motions to instruct SLAPP targets that the only thing “special” about those motions is the fees and costs they might recover if they are successful. 181 As Justice Frankfurter put it, “if a word is obviously

175
See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text. At least one other appellate judge has adopted this burden-shifting framework; see WPB Residents for
Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio, 284 So. 3d 555, 561–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2019) (Gross, J., concurring). But see id. at 564–65 (Forst, J., concurring) (“As
we have determined that we do not have jurisdiction . . . I do not believe it is appropriate at this juncture to render a view as to the merits of the parties’ legal
arguments or of the circuit court’s reasoning in denying Petitioners’ motions for
summary judgment and dismissal.”). In addition, Judge Gross opted to test the
target’s motion as one for summary judgment, rather than applying the special
motion-to-dismiss framework announced in Gundel. See id. at 563 (Gross, J., concurring) (“Based on the summary judgment evidence, Materio did not meet her
burden. Her claims are therefore ‘without merit’ under section 768.295(3).”).
176
See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text.
177
See supra note 147.
178
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 247–51.
179
See Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., 264 So. 3d 304, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2019) (accepting the argument that an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss “focuses not
on whether a cause of action has been sufficiently alleged but on whether the activity that is alleged to have given rise to the cause of action is protected activity . . . .”).
180
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015) (special motion to
strike); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502 (West 2012) (special motion to dismiss); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012) (special motion to dismiss); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 1996) (special motion to dismiss).
181
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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transplanted from another legal source . . . it brings the old soil with
it.” 182
With all that said, a federal court tasked with interpreting Florida
law must predict how the Florida Supreme Court would decide the
issue. 183 Decisions of the Florida District Courts of Appeals “provide guidance” in that endeavor. 184 Federal courts will disregard
those decisions, however, “if persuasive evidence demonstrates that
the [Supreme Court of Florida] would conclude otherwise.” 185 The
rest of this Note will assume that the foregoing evidence is sufficiently persuasive for a federal court to disregard the Gundel court’s
interpretation of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute.
IV.

APPLYING THE REA/RDA/ERIE ANALYSIS TO FLORIDA’S
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE
Using that interpretation of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute, coupled with the predominant approach to putative conflicts between
Federal Rules of Procedure and states’ anti-SLAPP statutes, this Part
posits that, unlike most anti-SLAPP statutes, Florida’s version does
not infringe on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12, or 56. 186 As

Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 537 (1947).
183
See, e.g., Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations
omitted).
184
Id. (citations omitted).
185
Id. See also Knealing v. Puelo, 675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996) (concluding
that a statute unconstitutionally “intrudes upon the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court” when it “set[] forth only procedural requirements”); Massey v.
David, 979 So. 2d 931, 935–36 (Fla. 2008) (holding that statute’s “purely procedural nature” “compelled” conclusion that statute unconstitutionally “intrudes
upon the powers of the judiciary, through the Florida Supreme Court, to determine
matters of practice and procedure before the Florida courts.”). Similarly,
“[f]ederal courts are not bound by dicta of state appellate courts.” Kendall v. Pladson (In re Pladson), 35 F.3d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); accord
McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.3d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Wade, 152 F.3d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And, as already discussed, the Gundel court’s discussion of the procedural aspects of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute is
dicta. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
186
See supra Section II.B.
182
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a result, the Rules of Decision Act guides the choice-of-law analysis. 187 This Part analyzes each step in turn.
A.

Florida’s Version Does Not Conflict with Any Federal
Rules
A brief discussion of Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 brings the conflicts analysis into focus. Under Rule 8, a complaint must include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” 188 A defendant can question the sufficiency of
such a statement by moving to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6). To survive such a motion, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a facially plausible claim for relief. 189 In the same
way, a defendant can challenge the complaint’s legal basis by moving for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). 190 But, if “matters . . . are presented to and not excluded by the court” on either
motion, then “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” 191 And summary judgment is proper only
when no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. 192 In sum, these Rules provide a comprehensive framework
governing pretrial dismissal and judgment. 193
Most states’ iterations of the anti-SLAPP statute disturb that
framework by raising the bar for a filer to overcome a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 194 or for summary judgment under
See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
189
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).
190
See 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1367 (3d ed. 2020) (“The motion for a judgment on the pleadings only has utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain to be decided by the
district court.”).
191
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
192
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a).
193
Carbone v. Cable News Network, 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018).
194
See id. at 1356 (holding that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with
Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires the “plaintiff to establish ‘a probability’ that he
‘will prevail on the claim’ asserted in the complaint”); La Liberte v. Reid, 966
F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that California’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts
with Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires “dismissal unless the plaintiff can
187
188
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Rule 56, 195 and by creating a separate device to test a claim’s validity. 196 Not so for Florida’s statute. Instead, it instructs SLAPP targets to test the validity of a filer’s claim by using preexisting procedural devices. 197 Indeed, any other interpretation would cast doubt
on the statute’s constitutionality under the Florida Constitution’s
separation of powers provision. 198
As a result, Rules 8, 12, and 56 have the requisite space to operate. Once a target appeals to the procedures outlined by those rules,
a court can test the filer’s claim as it would on an ordinary motion.
When a court finds that a given claim is in fact meritless, the statute’s fee-shifting provision applies if the claim arises from the target’s protected speech. 199 In this sense, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute
fuses with Rules 8, 12, and 56, deferring to those devices for the
relevant procedures, while adding a substantive element—the type
of activity giving rise to the filer’s claim—for claims that fall within
the statute’s ambit. 200 In sum, the statute neither raises the bar for a
‘establish[] a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim’”); Klocke v.
Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires “‘clear and specific evidence’
that a plaintiff can meet each element of his claim”); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp.,
LLC., 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that D.C.’s anti-SLAPP
statute conflicts with Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires dismissal when the “plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success on the merits”).
195
Compare Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350–51 (internal citations omitted) (holding that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with Rule 56 because it “contemplates a substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on his claims.”), with Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir.
2016) (assuming that Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute does not conflict with Rule
56 because it provides the same standard for summary judgment as Rule 56).
196
Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1351 (“In other words, the [Federal] Rules contemplate that a claim will be assessed on the pleadings alone or under the summary
judgment standard; there is no room for any other device for determining whether
a valid claim supported by sufficient evidence to avoid pretrial dismissal.”).
197
See supra Section III.A.2.
198
See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text.
199
See supra Section III.A.1.
200
See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323 (S.D. Fla.
2016) (suggesting that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute “fuses with Rules 8, 12, and
56 by entitling the prevailing party to fees and costs if, after invoking the devices
set forth by those rules, a court finds an action is ‘without merit’ and thus prohibited.”). As Bongino shows, the questions of whether a target’s speech is protected,
and whether that speech is the primary cause of the filer’s suit, require minimal
analysis. See id. (citing Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 831–32 (11th
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filer to overcome a motion for pretrial disposition nor creates a separate device to test the validity of a filer’s claim. Therefore, the statute leaves intact the comprehensive framework set forth by Rules 8,
12, and 56, avoiding conflict with those Rules altogether.
B.

Applying Florida’s Statute in Federal Courts Serves
Erie’s Twin Aims
When there is no conflict between the relevant state law and the
Federal Rules, the Rules of Decision Act governs the choice-of-law
analysis. 201 And that choice turns on the twin aims underlying Erie:
avoiding the unfairness that arises when litigation differs because it
is brought in federal court and deterring the correlative forum-shopping. 202 Applying Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute carries out both of
these goals. As for the first aim, applying the statute avoids unfairness that would result if a SLAPP target could recover attorney’s
fees in a Florida court but not in a federal court. With no ability to
recoup attorney’s fees and costs, a target might submit to a SLAPP
altogether, 203 leading to the chilling effect that anti-SLAPP statutes
aim to wipe out. 204
To that end, applying the statute in federal court eliminates any
incentive for SLAPP filers to prefer federal rather than state court.
Because a SLAPP filer’s purpose is to punish or silence the target, 205
there is a double incentive to file in whichever forum does not have
an anti-SLAPP statute. For example, if Florida’s statute does not apply in federal court, not only can a SLAPP filer evade the risk of
having to pay the target’s attorney’s fees and costs, but the SLAPP
filer can also better accomplish their purpose—to punish and silence

Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause [p]laintiff’s suit ‘arose out of’ [d]efendant’s news report,
the second element—free speech in connection with a public issue —is also satisfied.”).
201
See supra pp. 7–13.
202
Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965) (“The ‘outcome-determination’ test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”).
203
See supra note 17.
204
See Memorandum from Shetterly, supra note 8, at 2–3.
205
See Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 939.
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the target 206—because the target can no longer recover fees and
costs to fund their defense.
On the other hand, the presence of countervailing federal interests at times counsels against applying a state’s law, even when doing so would serve Erie’s twin aims. 207 The argument might state
that federal courts have no business applying “exotic” state procedural rules. 208 But Florida’s statute does not require that of federal
courts. 209 In fact, the opposite is true: federal courts often apply state
laws that contain fee-shifting elements. 210 For all of these reasons,
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute should apply in Federal Court.
CONCLUSION
Even under an expansive reading of the Federal Rules, there is
no conflict between the Rules and Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute.
Florida’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision—which attaches to
claims that arise primarily because a target spoke (a) before a government entity about matters under review or (b) in connection with
an assortment of multimedia—steps back and leaves the procedure
to state and federal devices. In this way, the statute is simply a feeshifting law for an important constitutional right. Using the interpretive arguments outlined by this Note, practitioners should trigger
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute more often. Indeed, lawyers can use
this tool for pro-bono and corporate media defendants alike and, in
doing so, defend the right to engage in robust debate on public issues
for all Floridians no matter their financial means. After all, that is
the statute’s stated intent. 211

See Memorandum from Shetterly, supra note 8, at 1–2.
See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
208
See Makeaff v. Trump Univ., LLC 715 F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir. 2013)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Federal courts have no business applying exotic state
procedural rules which, of necessity, disrupt the comprehensive scheme embodied
in the Federal Rules . . . .”).
209
See supra Section III.
210
See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323–24 (S.D. Fla.
2020) (“decades of Eleventh Circuit precedent . . . find that state-law statutes and
claims for attorneys’ fees and costs ‘unequivocally’ apply in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction.”).
211
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(1) (West 2015).
206
207

